This is Brad DeLong's Grasping Reality—my attempt to make myself, and all of you out there in SubStackLand, smarter by writing where I have Value Above Replacement and shutting up where I do not… From Plato to NATO to MAGA: Marco Rubio’s Myths & the Real "Western Alliance"Reässessing the “West” from John Winthrop to Marco Rubio…Reässessing the “West” from John Winthrop to Marco Rubio…I see in my feed this AM that Marco Rubio is a moron. Excellent! I am always for a good Trump grifter smackdown. The smartest and most incisive things I skimmed were by Dan Drezner: <https://danieldrezner.substack.com/p/five-thoughts-about-marco-rubios> <https://danieldrezner.substack.com/p/frank-talk-and-limited-action>. But the most interesting, however, was by the extremely sharp Arthur Goldhammer:
So I find I have four points to make, dissenting in part and concurring in part: First, I have a bone to pick with Arthur, with respect to “markets for its wares”. This phrase here is a badly thought a contemporary intellectual echo of a not-very-good theory of Belle Époque imperialism, which was a horse saddled by John A. Hobson, promoted by Rosa Luxemburg, and then ridden to exhaustion and collapse by Vladimir Lenin. This horses was then revved by not very careful and ideology-driven American new leftist historians feeling their oats, and desperate to somehow argue that evil Amerikkkan capitalism was responsible for staging the Cold War in order to turn western Europe into its-neocolony. (And I do hear a further echo of this in the sparse and spare description of Stalin’s Soviet Union merely as America’s “erstwhile… ally”, rather than as the aggressive super-genocidal totalitarian dictatorship ruled by paranoid psychopathic madman that it was.) This line of argument i s largely false. Keynesian arguments that Marshall Plan and other aid would redound to America’s prosperity were made to try to make the political coalition against an isolationist post-WWII American policy viable. But they were a tertiary add-on to further justify a policy path overwhelmingly chosen for other reasons, not something to be listed first among the reasons that the post-WWII U.S. “needed” western Europe. That makes me reach, not for any metaphorical revolver—well, let’s put it this way: when I was learning to drive, we had a Chevy Impala with a faulty electrical system that would deliver a nine-volt shock every time I used the horn; I used not to overuse the horn, a valuable thing to have learned. Second, I do wish Rubio knew enough American history to understand that our American Errand Unto the Wilderness was not undertaken not because we here in the New World want to share “the deepest bonds that nations can share” with the Old World. It was, rather, undertaken because we wanted to break them. I do not think Rubio has ever bothered to read my ancestor John Winthrop’s “Model of Christian Charity” sermon describing how he hoped things would be different in Massachusetts: that it would be a City upon a Hill:
And consider:
This hope and dream of John Winthrop indeed came true to an astonishing and unlikely degree—although in a way and in a form that would certainly horrify him in many of its particulars—cf. <http://onlyfans.com>, for example. America, starting in 1776, did indeed find a way while Europe was losing it. And by the end of 1940 continental Europe, at least, had decisively lost its way: But from 1942 to 1945 and after we came, highly effectively, to the rescue. Yes, Winston Churchill and his Britons (and Charles de Gaulle and his Free French) can grumble that we arrived very late to the picnic that was World War II, but when we did arrive we brought a hell of a lot of refreshments. And we kept bringing additional tranches—financially, politically, ideologically—for decades after. Third, Arthur Goldhammer correctly notes that the “NATO” part of the Plato-to-NATO arc was made in post-WWII Washington DC, and that the Plato-to-NATO arc itself was largely invented out of whole cloth by tame propagandists for the good cause of containing Stalin’s Soviet Union who, in the words of my old teacher Judith Shklar:
But this was in a good cause. Picking out heroes from the past whom you admire, retrospectively adopting them as your ancestors, and then trying hard to live up to their virtues is a very human practice, and a virtue-enhancing one, even though it is not a rational one. One of the best and weirdest novels I have read this past decade—Graydon Saunders’s The March North—has a very nice putting of this. The first-person protagonist is dismissing his troops—a bunch of militia who have just been to a hell from which some of them have come back:
Mythmaking in a good cause is a different human social practice than history, but it is a useful (and valid?) social practice. Historians do the second. Politicians are supposed to balance off the two. Good ones succeed. But mythmaking in a fascist cause? No thanks. No thanks indeed. And shame on those who put and keep that on the menu. Fourth, as I said, Arthur Goldhammer correctly notes that the “NATO” part of the Plato-to-NATO arc was made in post-WWII Washington DC. But Europe—especially Britain—was not without agency here. Step back, and it is valid historically to interpret U.S. foreign policy from 1939 to 1953 as largely made in the Palace of Westminster over the previous near-century, and the actual policy choices made in Washington DC then as the turning-over by the British Empire of the hole cards that it had dealt itself from the bottom of the deck, revealing that it had hidden wired aces and so would decisively win the poker game of 1900s great power politics. What were those hidden wired aces? That somehow, between 1861 and 1939, Britain had effectively reäbsorbed the United States into the British Empire as a late-mobilizing but by far the most powerful part, in the sense that it could draw on all of its resources when the chips were truly down. This did not happen purely by accident. I have not, however, seen the history well-told. Back in 1861 the Jacksonian American élite loathed Britain—who, after all, had Andrew Jackson won his great victory over?—and at the mass level the political juice was and long would remain generated by Irish-Americans memories of the genocidal British Empire of the Potato Famine. (Ask yourself where the FBI deployed its counterterrorism resources in the 1980s, and realize that it was in South Boston against the funding channels for the Irish Republican Army.) On the other side, the realpolitikers in Westminster saw dividing the U.S. into two or more as a great source of potential benefit; the Tory landlord-and-professions élite saw the hierarchy-loving plantation slave-owning wannabe gentry of the American South as much more their kinds of people than the commercial-industrial Yankees of the American North, and only the Liberal Party’s commitment to antislavery keeping Britain from intervening on the side of the South in the Civil War to support the noble principle of Free Trade. Yet eighty years later it had all profoundly shifted. Why? How? References:
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From Plato to NATO to MAGA: Marco Rubio’s Myths & the Real "Western Alliance"
Monday, 16 February 2026
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