This is Brad DeLong's Grasping Reality—my attempt to make myself, and all of you out there in SubStackLand, smarter by writing where I have Value Above Replacement and shutting up where I do not… Looking at Today's Democratic PartyMake more, share better: it has to combine supply-side dynamism to fair distribution. But is there any reason to think that that prestidigitational construction and maintenance of such an...Make more, share better: it has to combine supply-side dynamism to fair distribution. But is there any reason to think that that prestidigitational construction and maintenance of such an incredibly broad political coalition is not an impossible lift?…Ezra Klein writes:
And Henry Farrell glosses:
Indeed, 75 years ago Dean Acheson, ex-Secretary of State under Harry S Truman, wrote:
What is my reaction to all of this? First, Acheson is long out of date and obsolete. The Republicans of seventy-five years ago were indeed the party of business, enterprise, entrepreneurship, and wealth—the party of millionaires and of those who aspired to become such, of “temporarily embarrassed millionaires” in John Steinbeck’s phrase. In the long mid‑century arc from the McKinley‑Coolidge synthesis through Eisenhower, their median coalition priorities were predictable, and made sense as promotors of growth, albeit maldistributed growth, in a world where capital was scarce, organized labor rising, and the commanding heights of the economy were steel, autos, and oil—industries whose owners sought quiet, predictable returns rather than disruptive redistribution. But the political economy has since shifted: the locus of rent extraction, the sectoral composition of wealth, and the technologies of information, finance, and platform power have reconfigured the right’s coalition and agenda. Thus to treat the present Republican Party as the same one Acheson faced is to commit a historian’s category error: the rhetoric may rhyme, but the material base—and so the program—does not. Seventy-five years ago, the Republican core talked as if economic growth, technological change, and Schumpeterian creative-destruction were indeed the point: the disruptions were the price of admission to Abundance, and Abundance was the telos. Entrepreneurs would churn, incumbents would be dethroned, factor reallocation would do its work, and—even though there were big losers in the short run—a political economy of patience would yield a long-run positive-sum harvest: higher productivity and broader consumption possibilities. Dynamism was a civic virtue. The state’s role was to heat up the furnace so that the competitive process could run as hot as possible, That was the catechism: trust the process of innovation and market selection because the business of America was business. But today’s party is much less animated by the restless energies of enterprise than by the defensive custodianship of property—material holdings, yes, but also status and symbolic hierarchies. The expected upside from market-driven change has, for the Republican core, shrunk relative to the perceived downside risks. The coalition has pivoted from Schumpeterian embrace of creative destruction to protection of incumbencies. In the late nineteenth century, this took the form of tariff fortifications and gold-standard orthodoxy; in the interwar and late-twentieth episodes, it appeared as regulatory veto points and cultural retrenchment designed to slow redistribution of rents and recognition. The thread is one of a party reoriented toward guarding what is already owned rather than widening the frontier of abundance. Growth-friendly openness has fallen for a politics of scarcity, in which loss-aversion governs both economic policy and cultural stance... Keep reading with a 7-day free trialSubscribe to DeLong's Grasping Reality: Economy in the 2000s & Before to keep reading this post and get 7 days of free access to the full post archives. A subscription gets you:
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Looking at Today's Democratic Party
Monday, 3 November 2025
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